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1.
THE INTERFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
NEUTRAL TRADE, 1861-186 5* COMPARED
WITH THE PRESENT POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.
Chapter I.
Introduction.
On October 21, 1915* Secretary of State Lansing instructed
Ambassador Page to lay before Sir Edward Grey, a note of some
twenty thousand words in length. In this note long in preparation
(too long many critics think), and preceded by numerous, but
briefer formal protests were summed up in a formal array all the
grievances v/hich the United States had suffered, or fancied itself
to have suffered, at the hands of the British navy since the
outbreak of the great far. The note is now nearly six months old
(April, 1913) and yet, except for a few minor and unimportant de-
tails, it still stands as a formal statement of America's position,
or rather the position of President Wilson's Administration. This
note was and is, according to Professor Hart, " the vigorous
declaration of the intention of the United States to champion the
integrity of established neutral rights against the lawless conduct
of belligerents. " (l) "By it," observes the New York Evening ^ost
,
"our Government will have furnished leading cases in international
law." (2)
On the other hand, the London Times thinks of the same note
that it " is unworthy of the better traditions of the Republic/'
dealing in technicalities that are still open to dispute, "as
though they were settled for all time," (3)
(l) Current History December 1915.
12 J New York Even in/?, P_os_t, November 8, 1915.
(-3) London Times
, November 8, 1915.
I
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13a this as it may, the American note of October 31 brings
forward to every thinking American citizen many stupendous questions
concerning the rights and duties of neutrals. We, as the most
powerful neutral nation, are vitally concerned for one thing, in
the question, "Just what is the basis of neutral rights, anyway 7"
And before we can answer that question, we must first clearly under-
stand what we mean when we talk of "neutral nation", "neutral
duties", and "neutral rights".
When the long threatening storm finally broke out in
Europe, a year and a half ago, and declarations of war were handed
out right and left, the family of nations became at once divided
into two great classes, neutrals and bellig erents . As to the
latter class, so far as they themselves are concerned, it makes
little difference to us legally what they may do to each other.
We may, perhaps, urge them to follow certain commonly recognized
principles in the conduct of their hostilities and may suggest that
they kill each other decently. Yet, so long as they confine their
activities to their own ranks, we, because we belong to the first
class, that of neutrals , can do no more than make suggestions.
There is some doubt about even this exception, as Mr. Ford, perhaps
discovered.
As neutrals, we must consider first our duties, "do
nothing", as a government to assist either or any belligerent,
either with arms, or men, or money." (l)
The older theory limited neutrality to the passive or
negative side. Modern practice extends the duties even further,
Hot only must we as a neutral government refrain from assisting
(l) Sir F. Piggott 19th Century April 1015.
'I
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either ^roup of belligerents, but we must, if the occa3 ion demands
,
even use force to prevent them from gaining aid or advantages from
us. (I) No better illustration of this can be offered than a
picture of the German cruisers lying, interned in our harbors,
guarded by United States guns.
But what, to get back to the original question, are
neutral rights, and what is their basis. "Are they", asks the
Nation, "merely a gracious (or grudging) concession by belligerents,
entirely at their mercy, or do neutrals base their claims upon a
positive legal basis, independent of the will or whim of a country
at war?" (2) it makes all the difference in the world which view
we accept. It is very like the" diff erence between a benevolent
tyranny and a guaranteed bill of rights." (3)
Naturally, the United States refuses to accept any but
the latter point of view. As President Wilson pointed out in
his note of October 21, we contend that neutral rights are based
upon the normal state of things. Belligerent rights are the
abnormal , and are limited by certain customs and precedents which
civilized powers have chosen to call International Law.
One of the cherished rights of neutrals is the "right of
navigation upon the high seas, which does not spring from the
consent of belligerents, but from the inherent right of all maritime
nations to make use of the sea as a common possession." (4)
It is in connection with this right that all our important
(1) Hall IV Chapter 1 and
(2) Nation Nov. 11, 1315 : 561. Of. New York Evening Post
Nov. S, 1915 and S.F. Piggot , 19th Century Apr, 1915
(3) Nation Ibid,
U) A. B. Hart Current History - Dec. 1915 ; 487 Cf,
American Note October 21, 1915.
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disputes with Great Britain have arisen, both now and in the past.
If the questions arising seem new and unprecedented, we have only tc
go back some fifty odd years to find the very same points of issue,
fundamentally, as exist today. The world is much smaller com-
mercially than it was during the Civil War. Telegraph cables,
wireless stations, fast steamers, and the marvelous development of
manufactories and industrial enterprises of every kind have enlarged
the quantity of the questions of right and duty involved, but
fundamentally, it is still true that "there is nothing new under
the sun,"
It is with the view to illustrate this truth, as well as
to present the whole case in as fair a manner as possible, that
this thesis is brought forward. It is not intended as an
exhaustive treatise of international law or a detailed historical
comparison
,
point by point, between the situations of 1831-1855
and today. Such a treatise would be far beyond the ability and
means of the writer.
What I shall endeavor to do will be merely to single out
two or three of what seem to be the big theories now in dispute,
couple them with actual practice and fact and then by going back
to the time when the situation was mors or less reversed, endeavor
to discover just how we correlated those same theories with our
own practice. If, from these investigations, I may draw some
conclusions as to the justice or injustice, excusable or inexcusable
nature of either Britain's or our own attitude, it is not because
I am either neutral or prejudiced, but because I have endeavored to
interpret the whole matter as the average fair-minded man who knows
something of history and has something of mat ter-of-factness , must
'I
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see it. I leave more learned discussions and speculation to more
learned men.
From the American note of October 31, 1915, it appears
that these questions are now at issue between Great Britain and the
United States;
(1) the right and manner of search of neutral vessels by
belligerent vessels at sea. This question also involves that of
obtaining evidence and the kinds of evidence employed.
(2) the questions of contraband and the doctrine of
continuous voyage.
(3) Blockade and the doctrine of continuous voyage.
(4) Transfer of flags in time of war.
(5) Misuse of neutral flags by belligerents.
(6) Armed merchantmen.
Since the publication of the note, there has been added
the question of the right of a belligerent to take enemies from
neutral ships, (l)
During our Civil War, practically every one of these same
questions came before the diplomatic world sooner or later. In
addition, there was also another which more than once brought this
country to the verge of war with Great Britain. This was the mat-
ter of the English-built Alabama and other Confederate cruisers.
This was, indeed, perhaps the most serious difficulty of all, but
because no analogy seems to exist in our present situation, I am
forced to pass over it with this bare mentioning. Then, too,
there was the Trent affair, which only because of the incompletion
of the Atlantic Cable, perhaps, failed to precipitate war with
(l) Chicago Tribune April 13, 1918.

Britain* and which \va3 never theless the occa8ion of diplomatic
threats and counter-threats. This, too, I must pass over lightly,
for, 8 trance as it malj seem, when we recall the Trent or the STar of
1812, the present British action in taking Germans from American
ships seem scarcely to have made a ripple upon the sea of
diplomatic sorrespondence.
My entire discussion will, in fact, be confined to the
fir t three points which I have enumerated, namely: the question of
search and evidence, the question of contraband, and the question
of blockade, with particular attention, in connection with the last
ttfo points, to the much-involved doctrine of continuous voyages.

7.
Chapter II.
GENERAL REMARKS UPON RESEMBLANCES AND DIFFERENCES
IN THE SITUATION TODAY AND THAT OF THE CIVIL
WAR PERIOD.
It will be well at this moment for the reader to glance
at the maps of Europe as it is today. Let us notice the importance
of geographical conditions, so faras the problems of the belliger-
ents are concerned. I am speaking with particular reference to
the coast-lines of the two groups of belligerents. Look at Germany
first. Here we find a coast-line, if we count the Baltic Sea
(which is of less importance than the western coast because it is
closed from six to seven months of the year), of from eight
hundred to a thousand miles in length. If we include the small
neutral countries of Denmark and Holland and al30 Belgium, this
line is lengthened by about two hundred-fifty miles. By means of
the Kiel canal, the disadvantage of the na rrow entrance to the
Baltic has been somewhat reduced.
Turning to Austria, the other Teutonic belligerent, and
Turkey, we may add almost another thousand miles. Unfortunately
for the Central powers, however, this latter fact becomes much less
important when we consider the fact that both the Turkish and
Austrian ports are all on the Mediterranean , which is commanded
by the Entente powers at Gibralter and Suez. In reality, then,
Germany can count upon only her own coast line and that of neutral
Holland and Denmarl as a gateway to the world market.
Turn now to the map of the United States, Begin at the
northern boundary of North Carolina and follow the coast-line
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around to the Rio Grand* j taking note of the harbors aa you go.
If we count Germany's Baltic ports and those of Holland, this coast-
line of the Confederacy is about three times that of Germany. In
addition to this there lies the long stretch of Mexican territory
along the Rio Grande.
Here we see at once an important point of difference
between the two situations which we are to compare. It is an
especially important one, so far as matters and disputes commercial
are concerned.
There is still another and equally important point of
difference. With three times the coast-line of Germany to be
blockaded, there was in 1861-1865 one of the smaller naval powers to
perform the task. As a neutral shipper, there was the "Mistress of
the Seas", with all her merchant marine, the greatest in all the
world even in those days.
Today, Germany with only a third of the Confederacy's
coast-line is confronted by not only the greatest single naval
power in the world, but also by all the lesser, ones of France,
Italy, Russia and Japan, The United States, the most powerful
neutral, is weaker in merchant marine than any of the Entente
belligerents, unless it be Russia and Japan. In naval armament
we rank fourth.
To put it concisely, in the Civil War, we, with a naval
strength far inferior to that of Great Britain, were able to impose
j
let us admit, serious restrictions upon the most important com-
mercial fleet of the world. Today, we, still with a smaller
navy and a comparatively insignificant commercial fleet, are as
a neutral endeavoring to check, by vigorous protests, every act
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which we consider an encroachment upon our rights, by the most
powerful navy and the largest merchant fleet which the world has
ever seen, even when considered relatively.
It is well to keep these facts in mind throughout the
following discussion. We are apt to draw analogies too closely
if we do not.
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Chapter III.
RULES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OP TODAY'S BEL1IG ERINTB.
I have referred to certain rules and customs which
belligerents are bound to observe in the conduet of hostilities.
Before we can understand the significance of many references in
the correspondence between the British and the American Governments
we must know something of just what these rule3 and customs are
based upon. Let us notice briefly, therefore, some of the more
important treaties and conventions which have the greatest signif-
icance in the present relations between belligerents and neutrals.
The first of such treaties of which we may observe fre-
ciuentmention in various diplomatic notes of today, is the Declar-
ation of Paris, drawn up and ratified in 1856 by most of the
belligerents of the present European struggle. It is of particular
interest to us because of the part played, or rather not played,
in it by the United States. By it were established four great
principles of naval warfare.
(l) Privateering is and remains, abolished.
(S) A neutral flag protects enemy goods ( with the ex-
ception of contraband).
(3) Neutral goods (except contraband) are not liable
to capture under the enemy's flag.
(4) Blockade, to be binding, must be effective, (l)
As anyone who has only casually read contemporary history
(l) Bentwich "Declaration of London : 3
U. S. Executive Documents 1861-3 I 34.
C. F. Adams "C. F. Adams" p. 300-1 etc.
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may observe, it is the second and fourth, especially the latter,
which is the most important in connection with our present discus-
c ion.
Yet, strange as it may 3eem, the United States is almost
the only important Government which has never ratified the Declar-
ation of Paris, Provision was made by the signatory powers to add
the United States to the list of signers. Our Government refused
to comply
, not because she was less liberal than her sister States,
but rather the contrary. Our Government ha3 always stood for the
exemption of all private property from capture at sea , whether it be
owned by belligerent or neutral , on board belligerent or neutral
vess el (contraband of war excepted) just as in land v/arfare . Our
~overnrnent
,
therefore, refused to give up privateering unless an
amendment be added, insuring all such private property against
capture at sea. (l)
When the Civil War broke out, however, Seward was not long
in seeing that the retention of privateering must be a much greater
advantage to the Confederacy than to the North. He therefore sent
out in April, 1831, a circular to our ministers in '^rsat Britain,
Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark
declaring that "prudence and humanity combine in persuading the
President, under the circumstances, to accept the lesser good
offered by the Declaration of Paris without waiting for the greater
one offered to the maritime nations by the President of the United
States. (2)
Unfortunately for Seward* s seemingly humane and consid-
erate concession, Lord Russell, England's foreign minister, sus-
[l)Senate Exec. Docs. 1S61-3,I pt. 1:41-3; Seward, Warks V 192
t2)Seward, Works V, 194; Sen. Ex. Docs. 1881-2 I, 1:44.

pected an ulterior motive. He feared that Saward 1 8 purpose was to
bind the neutral powers to exert pressure to prevent the U3e of
privateers by the Confederacy. He therefore most unkindly insisted
upon adding an amendment to the Declaration to the effect that
ratification by the United States should have no bearing on the war
then in progress, (l)
That Lord Russell was not far wrong in his suspicions
seems almost evident from the fact that Seward at once intrusted
Charles Francis Adams, our minister, to end negotiations upon the
whole matter, (2) To this day we never have ratified the articles*
Yet, so firmly have its principles become established that the
united States has always observed them, Any attempt on our part
to do otherwise would indeed " call down upon us the hostility of
every neutral power and involve us probably in a war with the
civilized nations." (3)
We come, now, to the Declaration of London of 1209, which,
although it has never been ratified by all the present belligerents,
and is therefore not legally binding £4) has been nevertheless of con
siderable importance in furnishing information and data in recent
diplomatic notes. (5)
This series of conventions or articles, attempting to
set forth the recognized rules of maiitime 'warfare, was drav/n up at
London, 1909, by representatives of the great naval powers of the
world. It is necessary for our present purpose to no more than
mention the main provisions. These dealt with the following points
(1) Seward Works V 390.
(2) Ibid 289-91; FullerAccount - 0. F. Adams "Seward & Dec of
(3) Benturch -Declaration of Londo.n -? v4l*, „„. Paris,U) Garner- Amer, Jour. Int. Law Apr, 1915:37^.
(5) Lansing to Page - Int. Core. X, P,6 - Amer. Note 21 etc.

13.
contraband, and its class if icat ion, blockade, doctrine of continuous
voyages, destruction of neutral vessels before condemnation in a
prize court, rules as to neutral ships rendering unneutral service,
conversion of merchant ships into warships on the high seas, trans-
fer of flags in time of war, determination of enemy property, (l)
It will be remarked that there is 3carcely a point enumerated that
has not entered into the present difficulties.
Although, as has been said, the Declaration of London has
never been ratified by all the belligerents and is therefore not
binding upon them, yet when the war broke out in 1314, President
Wilson caused a note to be sent to Britain, suggesting that the
Declaration be adopted as a temporary code for naval warfare. (?)
Great Britain promptly replied, declaring His Majesty's Government
had "decided to adopt generally the rules of the declaration in
question, subject to certain modifications and amendments which they
judge indespensable to the efficient conduct of their naval
operations." (3)
Among such "modifications and amendments", the most
important deal with the subjects of conditional and absolute con-
traband. Thus
,
by its Orders in Council of October 29, 1914 (4)
the 3ritish Government declared a presumption of belligerent
destination to rest upon any cargo consigned "to order. " There
were other such ordinances earlier and later which are contrary
to the spirit of the Declaration, but these are to be discussed be-
low* I cite such an example here only to explain why, upon
(l) Bentwich, Declaration of London - p. 7.
12j Amer. Journal Int. Law July 1915. - p. 1.
(3) Internation correspondence X, - p. 3.
(4) Ibid, pages 13-14
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receipt of the British note, our Government very promptly and
"very properly" (l) withdrew its suggestions and insisted "that the
rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the
present war be defined by existing rules of International Law and
the treaties of the United States, irrespective of the provisions
of the Declaration of London: and that this Government reserves to
itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case in which
those rights and duties so defined are violated by His British
Majesty's Government." (2)
Here then was a statement in clear-cut English that our
Government did not mean to acquiesce in Britain's action in putting
in force only those portions of the London Declaration which best
served her ends. It was a preliminary warning, perhaps, of the
broadside of "notes" which our busy President has kept up against
the 3ritish Government since the outbreak of the war. The effect
is that both our protests and England's defence must be based not
upon the unratified and comprehensive Declaration of London, but
upon our treaties, and that collection of precedents, treaties,
customs, which go to make up what we call "existing rules of
international law." Just wfeat those rules are can best be
illustrated in connection with each formal protest or series of
protests which have appeared since the outbreak of the present war.
This much may be here observed, however, that in a great many, if
not a majority of the cases in hand, it is to the action of the
Federal navy and prize courts of 1361-1555, that the appeal of
justification is mads.
tl) Garner Amer. Jour. Int. Law April 19l5j 374.
Lansing to Page, International Correspondence X p. S
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Chapter IV,
T-HE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE MANNER AND KINDS
OF EVIDENCE.
Let us consider first our complaint against Great Britain
in the matter of the detention and search of neutral ship3. It is
a general principle of internation law that the belligerent warship
has the right to stop and search,at any time on the high seas, any
neutral merchant ships for evidence of contraband or intention to
violate a blockade. So much, the United States has freely admitted
(l) But it is also a recognized principle of international law
that such search must be made art aea and captures must be made upon
grounds of "evidence found on the ship under investigation, and not
upon circumstances ascertained from external sources." (3)
In other words the question involves that of the manner
of obtaining evidence. we contend that all such evidence should be
obtained by belligerent search at sea and from the suspect ed ship
itself. Our Government has therefore protested at the British
action in the present war
,
alleging that "innocent vessels or
cargoes are now seised and detained on mere suspicion, while efforts
are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources, to justify the
detention and the commencement of prize court proceedings." (5)
The British reply to this protest, not by denying the
charge, but by declaring that modern conditions, involving huge
cargoes in transoceanic liners, make a search at sea impossible.
"If action had to be talc en solely on such information
as might be gathered by the boarding officer on his visit to the
(l)Bryan to "Page - Int. Cor. X 19-20. Garner Am. J. Int. Law,
April 1915; 373 : Amer. ~ote Oct 21,1915
tS|3 Wallace 9-10 (Springbok), Amer Tote Oct. SI, 1915.
(3;Am. Note Oct. 31 - for a list of such cases see Ap. to note
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ship, it would have been quite impossible to interfere appreciably
with German imports and the Allied Governments would therefore have
been deprive! of the recognized belligerent right." (l) A3 it is,
"They make use of every source of available information" to discover
destination and "exercise to the full the right of stopping such
goods as information showed to be suspect, while making a genuine
effort and honest attempt to distinguish between bona fide neutral
trade and hostile trade." To this end, a special contraband com-
mittee has been organized and "sit3 continually to pass on all such
matters. "early every ship for Holland and penmark is taken into
port for examination and every item of her cargo is immediately
considered in the light of all the information which has been
collected from the various sources open to the Government and which,
after a year and a half of war is very considerable. Any items
of cargo as to which it appears that, there is a reasonable ground
for suspecting any enemy destination are placed in the prize court
while articles as to the destination of which there appears doubt
are detained pending further investigations." In view of this
practice, shippers have avoided expensive delays by making agree-
ments with the British Government, on the general principle "that
His Majesty's Government obtain the right to require any goods
carried by the line, if not discharged in the British port of ex-
amination, to be either returned to this country (England) for
prize court proceedings or stored in the country of destination
until the end of the war or only handed to the consignee under
stringent guarantee that they will not reach the enemy," (2)
The above lengthy quotation from a recent British IThite
l) London Times, ~ov. 8, 1915. Of. Garner Ms, on Blockade
2; British White Paper -Gur. Hist, Mar, 1916, 1102, "1-22.
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paper is not a statement of theory, but of actual practice . Far
from denying the American charge, it 9 e eras to admit even more and
to frankly dsscribe an extraordinary exercise of right or Power of
detention and search.
As to the point in regard to taking vessels into port
for search, Sir Edward Grey defends the practice, declaring that
"In no other way can the right of search be exercised and but for
this practice, it would have to be abandoned alto:; sther. " (l)
Sir Edward then goes on to contsnd that after all, the British are
but following the precedent laid down by the united Sates in the
Civil TCar
,
notably in the case of the Bermuda, (3) to be considered
pres ently
.
Our Government has answered the "modern conditions"
argument, by the assertion that it has consulted a board of "naval
experts" as to the effect of such modern conditions upon the rules
governing search at sea. These experts have declared that "at no
period in history has it been considered necessary to remove every
package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of
her trade, or the service on which she is bound," but that "facil-
ities for boarding and inspecting modern ships are in fact greater
than in former times," except for a difference in time required. (3)
Referring to the British reminder in case of the Bermuda
a British ship condemned by the Federal prize courts for carrying
contraband ostensibly to Nassau, Tew Providence, but in reality to
a blockaded port ( referred to again under subject of blockade and
1) Grey to Page International Correspondence X p. 22,
2) Ibid.
3) Amer, rote October 21, 1913.

l'~.
continuous voyages) our Government declares that the case -as one
of "further proof - w a proceeding not to determine whether the ves-
sel should be detained and placed in a prize court, but whether
the vessel
,
having been placed in a prize court, should be restored
or condemned. " (l) That is, we contend that there is a difference
between dragging a neutral ship into a belligerent port and there
keeping her at expensive delays, merely upon unfounded suspicions as
to non-neutral destination and in calling for further evidence after
a ship has been found,
_^
search at sea to carry contraband and other
suspic ious cargo , as was the Bermuda, Moreover, in the latter
instance the cause was one of abn olute contraband, found on board
when the vessel was searched - such things as military blankets and
buttons marked C. S. A.
,
swords, etc. - and which any reasonable
man had a right to suspect of belligerent destination. In addition,
there was involved the question of blockade-running, which did not
enter into the cases referred to by the American note. (2)
Sir Edward Grey might with much greater force have pointed
to the case of the Springbok, captured under somewhat similar
circumstances, one hundred-fifty miles east of Nassau, In this
instance, external evidence, in the form of papers taken from block-
ade-runners captured elsewhere, was. introduced to show common owner-
ship and destination. Chief Justice -hase, in giving the opinion
of the Court, admittted that such invocation was not "strictly
regular" and should be used for further proof under suspicion. He
held, however, that the irregularity was not sufficient to counter-
balance the other evidences of guilt and justify a reversal of the
lower courts' decision. (3)
(1) Amer, Bote October SI, 1315.
(2) For arguments of case, 3 Wallace: 553 following.
(3) 3 Wallace: 20-31,
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This brings ua to a consideration of the kind3 of external
evidence which the British hav-? mado uas of. The first of these
which called forth a protest from the United States was that which
made an increase of United States imports by neutrals adjacent to
the enemy
, sufficient ground for detention of our ships with such
destinations. While a discussion of this phase of the question
can scarcely be separated from that of the doctrine of continuous
voyages, to be considered later, yet I think we had bsst note some
of the facts here. For instance, the fact that Italy (then a
neutral) had placed no embargo upon copper (contraband on Britain's
list), together with evidence of vastly increased importation of
that coir.r..cdi ty , was considered sufficient evidence of enemy
destination. Neutral ships, carrying copper to Italy were there^
fore detained, regardless of evidence of neutral character found
on board, (l)
In his note of February 10, 1315 ^rey showed how the
imports of Denmark and Scandinavia fror. this country had swelled
enormously since the outbreak of the war. That there is some
ground for the British argument, is frankly admitted by the New York
Evening ?os
t
which gives the .following figures:
U. S. Merchandise sent to Germany first 8 months 1914 -
|1 56,000 ,000
U. S. Merchandise sent to Germany first 3 months 1915 -
11,300,000
But during this latter period of eight months , our exports to
Holland, Norway, and Sweden increased by $114 ,300 ,000. (2) A
(1) S.F.Piggct cites Amer, Totes Nov. St Dec. 1914 -
ISth Centaury
,
April 1915: r'34-5.
(2) New York Evening Post To v. 6, 1915.
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recent British cartoon well illustrates one point of view. Holland
and Scandinavia are portrayed a3 two urchins with huge bundles of
foodstuffs on their backs, John Bull accosts them thus; " Eh, what
a
that? Only your luncheons.' Why what tremendous appetities you
have for such small 'una J (l)
President Wilson argues, however, that this is "external
evidence" and that "such a presumption is too remote from the facts
and offers too ^reat opportunity for abuse by belligerents To
such a rule of legal presumption, my Government cannot accede as it
is opposed to those fundamental principles of justice which are the
foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States and Oreat
Britain." (2)
Let us offer at this point another quotation which might
have come from Graves own pans
"Those neutral ports have suddenly been raised from ports
of comparative insignificant trade to marts of the first magnitude.
In this latter instance, however, the words are those of
Justice Betta, delivered in 1S33 in connection with his decision
condemning the British vessel, Stephen Kart. The ports referred
to are '."assau, Tew Providence; Oardenas
,
Ouba, and Ilatamoras., Mexico*
The Stephen Hart .vas captured off the coast of Florida, bound for
Qardenas, Cuba, from London* She had contraband on board.
Or turn to Seward's letter to Lord Russel concerning the
""eterhoff
,
1??°. In very flowery and character is tic language he
explains how trade vith b'atamoras " rose from a petty barter to a
commerce that engaged the mercantile activity of Liverpool and
Tondon." (4)
(l) Current History "arch 1916$ page 121,?.M Amer. Tote October 21, 101 5. 13) Scott Cases : 3 57
\il Saward to Lyons Kxsc. Toe. 1S62-3 I 308-0.
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It would seem that President iVilson conveniently forgets
these instances in his protest to Britain. The British are not
slow to remind us of them, either , and it adds somewhat to our
present embarassment. Yet, as some of our students have pointed
out, in our Civil War cases, we were dealing with unimportant sea
tov/ns, while in our present dispute, it is to independent states
of considerable size and population that our exports are going.
The British have admitted the difficulties in this latter connection
"The ports to .vhich the goods are consigned, such as
Rotterdam and Copenhagen, have in peace times an important trade,
which incr eas es - the difficulty of distinguishing between neutral
and enemy articles." (l)
Our Government argues that even were it to admit the
regularity and legality of introducing such evidence this difficulty
and liability to abuse would still remain. The situation is still
further complicated by the fact that these small neutral countries
quite naturally use more United States goods since the war has cut
off their C-erman trade. Certainly, the argument from United
States precedent loses considerable weight when we look more deeply
into the comparison.
Another cause of American complaint in the matter of
evidence is found in the British Order in Council of October 39,
1914, Section III reads: "Conditional contraband shall be liable
to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port, if the goods
are consigned "to order", or if the ship's papers do not show who
is the consignee of the goods." (2)
While our merchants and news editorials have had a good
(1) British White Paper Cur. Hist. March 1913: 1102
(2) Int. Ccr. X p. 10;Am. J. Int. Law-Sup. July } 1C15 p. 8.
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deal to say about this point, our official notes to England havtt
aaicl practically nothing of itjhis no doubt is Jus to tha fact that
we are somewhat embarassed by Civil War precedents. The note of
October 31 does explain that while our courts have employed bills
of "to order" character, yet we havs done so only to convict and not
to arrest. This is the view that Profe330r Earner takes in saying
U)
that such facts were taken only in connection with other evidence.
Secretary Bryan, however, in his note to Senator Gtone
(January 20,1915) admitted that the action of our courts in the
past was a source of some embarassment to us in our prssent
negotiations. "Our tribunals n
,
says .Bryan, " have held that the
shipment of contraband "to order" is corroborative evidence that the
cargo is really destined to the enemy instead of to the neutral
port of delivery," (2)
Mr, Bryan was no doubt thinking of Chief Justice Chase's
decision in the case of the Springbok ,1866*.
"That some other destination than "assau was intended may
be inferred from the fact that the consignment shown by the bills
of lading and manifests was 1 to order 1 or 'assigns' such a
consignment must be taken as a negation that any sale had been
made to anyone at Nassau - - - or had been intended." (3)
While it is true that this was indeed used with other
evidence, yet the words of the Chief Justice would seem to indicate
that much weight was put upon the nature of the consignment. At
Least this seemed to be the opinion of the writer of the note to
Stone when he said: "This Government cannot therefor t consistently
(l)Amer.
-
T
our. Int. Law April 1915; 383.
(2^- International Correspondence X
(3) 3 Wallace 26-37,'

protest against the application of rules which it haa in the past,
unless they ha ve not been pract iced a s heretofore. " (l)
That the last clausa of the Sacrttray's note ie a saving
one will be seen more clearly when we come to consider the distinc-
tion between absolute and conditional contraband. Be it noted here
however
, that Chase was speaking of abso lute contraband. This
fact adds somewhat to the strength of our argument.
The whole dispute over the right and manner of search
seems to arise out of the conflict between American and 3ritish
theories as to the "burden of proof'.' Our Government maintains that
the "onus of proof is or. the captor, not on the shipper". (S)
Britain, on the ether hand would hold the opposite view. Her point
of view is excellently illustrated by a recent cartoon in London
?unch . Here John Bull is represented as standing guard before
Europe. A man with a barrow of merchandise approaches. "Who goes
there", challenges John. "Xeutral.,n "Prove itJ" snaps the
sturdy s entry. (5)
Or note this statement from Sir Francis Piggott, another
English writer:
That doubt favors neutral "has no warrant in common sense,
for it puts a premium on neutral traders' ingenuity which has itself
given rise to the doctrine of continuous voyages - - - The true
criterion of destination must be found in the int ent ion of the
neutral purchaser, of which the neutral vendor may be ignorant. " (4)
In theory, at least, and usually in practice, American
Courts have taken the former \riew. With two 3uch conflicting
theories, we may expect disputes to arise.
(l) Int. Oor.X 3 (underscoring my own) (3) Earner AM. J. Int. Law
Apr. 1915;378 cf.Am. Not* 0.51,15. (3)0yuoted Lit. Dig. Mar.*,1916
[ iL 1 § th Sj&nja^rx.Asr.il~.lSLl 5 : n 7\~^ „ -
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Chapter V.
CONTRABAND AND CONTINUOUS "VOYAGES.
This brings us directly to the big questions of contraband
of war and the doctrine of continuous voayages. All merchandise
has been classified in the past, Is both American and English tri-
bunals, as follows:
(1) "Articles manufactured primarily, and ordinarily used
fcr military purposes in time cf war.
(2) "Articles which may and are used for the purposes of
war and peace, according to circumstances.
(0) "Articles used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
(4) "Merchandise of the first class, destined to a bel-
ligerent country or places occupied by the army or navy of a bel-
ligerent, is always contraband. Merchandise of the second class
is contraband only when actually destined to the military or naval
use of the belligerent, while merchandise of the third class is not
contraband at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for
violation of blockade cr 3iege." (l)
These are the words of our own Chief Justice Chase, de-
livered in the case of the Peterhoff , 1853. The Chief Justice then
went on to discuss the rules governing contraband, in such forceful
and clear-cut language that I take the liberty of quoting him here
at some length.
"The trade of neutrals with belligerents in the articles
not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted by blockade.
Hence, while articles not contraband might be sent to Matamoras and
beyond to the rebel region where the communications were not inter-
rupted by blockade," articles of contraband nature "were liable
(1) Scott Oases 760-51.

to capture if thiir*, r;al destination was to a oalli^erent — - It
is true that even these goocto, if really intended for sals in
Llatamoras, would be free of liability; for contraband may be trans-
ported by neutrals to a neutral port, if intended to make a part
of its general stock in trade." (l)
It was this general classification that was agreed upon in
the Declaration of London, (2) and for which our Oovernment is now
contending. Yet, until the Declaration of London or 3ome similar
convention is properly ratified, all such classifications de::snd
upon the more or less arbitrary action of the belligerents them?-
s elves. Bryan concedes this in his not; to Stone, already quoted.
He says further: "When neutral, we have stood for a restricted list
of absolute and conditional contraband. As a belligerent, we have
contended for liberal lists, according to our concepts of the
cast." (3)
A contemporary English writer says "therefore, good sense
has decreed that the destination of an ship to an enemy port shall
be adapted as a practical'^working factor in its application, at
least in the case of conditional contraband. " (4)
Yet, the right to determine what shall be free and what
shall be contraband is not entirely unlimited. It "must be in
conformity with existing treaties and the generally recognized rules
of international law." (5) In other words, it must not be greatly
at variance with such precedents as those furnished by Ohase in
the case of the Peterhoff.
Great Britain's first list of contraband was almost the
Cl) Scott -Oases 7 30-32; 5 Wallace 54-30.
C2 J Cohen - Declaration of London SO-99.
(3) Int. Gone. X: 4. (4) ^iggott -13th Cent. Ap, 1915; 375
(5) Earner: International Law, Ap, 1915: 37 5.
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same as that of the Declaration of London and coming largely within
Chase's own cla3s if icatione. Aeroplanes and other aircraft, which
are conditional contraband in the Declaration, are made absolute in
the list. The list of conditional contraband included foodstuffs
and grains, which we have always put on the free list, (l)
The li :t of October 29 added to absolute contraband un-
wrought copper, sulphuric acid, iron -pyrites , leadj rubber, all
motor vehicles, and many other articles ^hich the Declaration of
London classified as conditional or free, while the list of con-
ditional contraband grew at the expense of the free list* (13) A
longer list was issued December 23 (3) and on March 11, raw wool,
tin, lubricants, hides, etc. were put on the absolute list. (4)
Finally, in February, when the German Government commandeered all
( 5)
grain and flour, these were put on the list of absolute contraband.
Cotton was not put on the contraband list until August 1315.
Indeed, Grey wrote Page, January 7 of that year, that n His Majesty's
Government have been most careful not to interfere with cotton and
its place on the free list has been scrupulously maintained - - and
on every occasion, when questioned on that point, they stated their
intention of adhering to this practice." (s)
This was quite in line with English precedent. She had
(7)
protested against Russia's act in making cotton contraband in 1905.
The Declaration of London declared it to be free. For diplomatic
reasons, therefore, England let it remain on the free list for a
year. She finally placed it on the contraband list, however, upon
the ground that it was being used in making explosives. (S) Having
(l) Text order in Council Am. J. Int. Law Sup. IX S-10.
12 j Ibid 12-13. (3) Ibid t6-17. (4) Ibid 21.
(5) Am, J. Int. Law Apr. 1915 -p. 373.
(5) Int. Cone. X. P. 21. (7) ration (K. Y. )Aug, 36/15: 349
(8) Ibid.

thus seen how thoroughly Britain has made use of her prerogative, or
rather her power as a belligerent to make this most comprehensive
list of contraband, let us compare it with our own lists of fifty
years ago.
Bryan, in his note to Stone, reminds the Senator that the
United States has, in the past "placed all articles from which
ammunition is manufactured in its contraband li3t and has declared
copper to be among such materials," (l) Furthermore, the Secretary
reminds Stone, "in the past the United States has exercised the
right of embargo upon exports of any commodity which might aid the
enemy's cause." (2) Mr, 3ryan is without doubt referring, in this
latter case to the action of the United States during the Civil War
in empowering our consuls at New York and elsewhere to stop suspi-
cious shipments of carload provisions to the British islands near
Confederate ports. (3) Since this is a subject more closely
related to that of blockade, we shall consider it in greater detail
under that head.
As to classifying foodstuffs as contrabands, I find no
instance in our Civil War practice unless the case of the embargo,
just mentioned, be so taken. Indeed, the v/ords of Chief Justice
Chases quoted above in the clas if ication of merchandise would seem
to be am emphatic denial of any powers to do so. G-rey, in defend-
ing Britain's act, pleads the peculiar nature of the German system
of military control. The Germans have, he asserts, organized "an
elaborate machinery" for the purpose of securing foodstuffs from
over the sea for the army.
(l) Int. Cone. "ov. 1915 p. 5; cf. Scott gas es 760-31.
(3 j Ibid p. 3,
(3) Ex. Docs. 1832-3. I, 280-34, 293-4.
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"Under the c ircums tances aaya Grey, "it would be abaurft
to give any definite pledge that in caaea where the aupplies car. be
proved to be for the uae of the enemy, they ahould be giren
immunity by the simple expedient of dispatching them to an agent in
a neutral port." (l) He goes on to discuss the then recent German
act placing all flour and grain under governmental control and
points out that the German civil population i3 largely a mere
reserve for the army. Therefore, "The reason for drawing a dis-
tinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil population and
those for the armed forces of the enemy disappear when the distinc-
tion between civil population and the armed ?orces disappears." (2)
Accepting the classifications of the Declaration of London,
therefore, 7/hich permits food to be classed as condi t ional contra-
band when destined to the armed forces of the enemy, (3) rather than
that of Chase, who would make it always free, the English have gone
still further and subjected foodstuffs to the same treatment as
absolute contraband. Our Government has put itself on record as
protesting against this, but it must be admitted that it has been
only a half-hearted protest.
The only case of any importance under this act is that of
the Wilhelmina which, with a car~o of grain and flour, was captured
enroute to Hamburg, shortly after the British decree had been
issued. There were numerous other questions involved in this case,
however, and before the prize court had come to its decision, the
British blockade of March 11 changed the whole situation. The
final result was that the British compromised the matter by buying
the cargo of the Wilhelmina thems el vss, (4) On the face of it, at
(1) Int. Cone. X: 34 (3) Int. Cone. X: 35.
(^Cohen Declaration of London Art, 24 p. 96
I
( 4 Int. Cone. X: 54.
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least, this seems to me like an admission of Britain's lack of
power to call foodstuffs intended for civil population absolute
contraband.
Leaving the discussion of the determination of contraband*
we may say that as to its treatment when once determined, "the two
great war doctrines are the right of the neutral trader to trade in
contraband and the belligerent nations to seize his cargo." (l)
Since our dispute with Britain seems to be largely one of
the treatment of conditional contraband, the whole question natur-
ally merges into one of the application of the doctrine of contin-
uous voyages. "It is absolutely clear, from this remarkable reply
(Grey to Page, February 10 A quoted above) that this doctrine has
become the one principle worth fighting for now, for our national
safety depends upon it. n (2) Since American protests to Britain
as appeared in our discussion of search and evidence seem to con-
verge towards this general head, we are inclined to agree with a
part, at least, of this, Sir Francis Piggotts* assertion.
The doctrine of continuous voyages is perhaps no where
better defined than in the words of Chief Justice Chase, delivered
in the case of the Bermuda, 1365.
"It makes no difference whether the destination to the
rebel port was ulterior or direct; nor could the question of
destination be affected by transshipment - - - - for that could not
break the continuity of the transportation of the cargo. - - - - a
transportation from one point to another remains continuous, so long
as the intent remains unchanged, no matter what stoppages or tran-
shipments intervene." (3)
(1) Piggott 19th Century Apr. 1915: 745.
(2) Piggott 19th Century Apr. 1915: 7 45.
(3) 3 7/allace: 553.
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The Declaration of London recognizes the doctrine in
article 30 to the effect that "It la immaterial whether the carriage
of the goods is direct or entails transshipment or a subsequent
transport by land." (l)
Both these definitions, if such they may be called, apply
only to absolute contraband. The Declaration of London expressly
states that conditional contraband shall not be so treated except in
the face of conclusive evidence. (?) Chase's classification and
description of contraband in the case of the Peterhoff (o) quite
plainly meant to set forth such an idea as he did in the case of
the Bermuda, just cited. (4)
Let us pause to take a hasty glance at the history of the
doctrine of continuous voyage. Sir Francis Piggot, already
frequently quoted, credits our own courts with its discovery. It
was the American judges, he declares, who w in characteristic and
( 5]
logical manner - - - discovered the doctrine of continuous voyages.'
Professor Garner declines to give to the United States
the doubtful honor. He says that the French applied the doctrine
first in the Crimean War. (s)
Be this as it may, the important thing to observe is that
our courts did elaborate upon and make excellent use of the doctrine
in such cases as those of the Bermuda, Springbok, Stephen Hart,
Peterhoff, Gertrude and scores of others not referred to. While
Britain attempted to apply it in the Boer War, the ships seized -
Bundesrath, Herzog , and General - were released under Germany's
protest. (7) It is to our own Civil War cases that we find the
(l) Cohen Declaration of London p. 102. (2) Ibid p. 109
(3) Ibid p. 39 (4) Cf. Garner - Am. J. Int. Law A p. 1915
pp. 387-90. (5) 19th Century Ap. 1915: 747 - cf. British
White Paper - Current His. Liar. '16:1102 (s) Garner - Am.
J. Int. Law Ap. '15: 587-8 (7) Ibid.
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Greatest number of references in diplomatic notes.
By her order in council of October HO, Creat Britain ex-
tended the doctrine of continuous voyages to apply to conditional
contraband, (l) This, as the ordinance admitted, is in direct
contradiction to the "Declaration of London' 3 stand upon that point.
Our own courts, while they may have stretched the point at times,
have yet maintained a distinction somewhat parallel to, if not even
more emphatic than, that made in the Declaration of London. Said
Chase, in the case of the Peter hoff, " a large portion of this cargo
was of second class" (conditional contraband), "but not proved to be
actually destined to belligerent use and cannot therefore, be
treated as contraband." (3) Moreover, he went on to say that even
absolute contraband, "if really intended for sale in the market of
Uatamoras, would be free of liability; for contraband may be trans-
ported by neutrals to make part of its general stock in trade." (3)
The same learned jurist gave an almost identical opinion in the
Springbok case. (4)
Of Great Britain's conduct in the present war, Professor
0-arner says, "She is now applying the rule which British prize
courts have always repudiated," (5) and he quotes numerous "English
writers, such as Hall Westlake, and Bentwich to support his
assertion. To these might be added the name of Arthur Cohen, (s)
Indeed, these writers even go so far as to deny the legality of the
application of continuous voyages to absolute contraband. (7)
Compare this statement from a British White Paper: "We
had the right
.
(under Order in Council Oct. 29, 1914) to seize
Tl)lnt. Cone. X: 10 (2) Scott Cases 731 (3) Ibid
(4) 5 Wallace: 35 (3) AM, J. Int. Law Apr. 1915: 391.
(d) Cohen Declaration of London.
(7) Quo t 3d Am. J. Int. Law Apr. 1915: 391.

as,
articles of conditional contraband if it could be proved that they
were destined for the enemy Government or its armed forces in the
cases specified above (consignments to Holland and Denmark "to
order" or not under embargo), although they were to be discharged
in a neutral port, (l)
We have here set forth, in other words, the claim of
legality in the application of the doctrine under discussion to
conditional contraband, the authority for such a stand being a
municipal act. When we recall that Britain's term "conditional
contraband" includes many articles which we have always called free j
it i? not strange that cur (Government has protested.
Sir Edward Grey, seeming to admit that his Government has
departed somewhat from its earlier proclaimed theories, yet contends
that Britain's act3 only represent an adaptation of international
precedent to "modern conditions? Turning again to "the principle
that the burden of proof should always rest upon the captor", he
says that such has not been the practical theory and "time alone
can show whether the rules there (Declaration of London) laid down
will stand the test of modern warfare". (3) From which statement
it will be observed that Sir Edward is again deliberately ignoring
the distinction made between conditional and absolute contraband
"as there laid down" and discussed above.
Another defense brought forward by the British is based
upon the alleged irregular conduct of the Germans. Such conduct
has placed their own actions within the realms of "necessity" "to
protect the belligerents' national safety," (o) is the British
contention. This was in reply to our Governments' protest of
(1) Cur, Kist. Mar. 1913: 1102 (3) Int. Cone. X 29-33.
(3) Grey quoted by Piggott -19th ^ent. Apr. 1915: 736.
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December 36j 1914, that "this Government is reluctantly forced to
the conclusion that the presumption of His British Majesty's
Government towards neutral ships and cargoes exceeds the manifest
necessity of a belligerent and constitutes a restriction upon the
rights of American citizens on the high seas which is not justified
by the rules of international law", (l)
Mr. Wilson firmly denies that "retaliation and expediency"
can give sufficient grounds for the other belligerent to change by
municipal statute or ordinance, the recognized principles of inter-
national law, so far as innocent neutrals are concerned. (2)
Indeed it is almost amusing were it not for the bitter
tragedy involved, to observe with what consistency the English mind
refuses to recognize our views of neutrality, John Bull, full of
his own troubles and miseries, cannot understand how we, as a Gov-
ernment, can blind our eyes to the fact that he and his allies are
all right and Germany and hers are all wrong. He sees us quibbling
over mere technicalities , "while the Allies are fighting for all
that they and Americans hold sacred". In such a situation, the
United States argues that it "possesses a general right to enjoy it^
international trade, free from unusual and arbitrary limitations".
To them we seem practically to "demand that Great Britain and her
allies should divest themselves of a very large part of the
advantages they derive in this war from their superior naval force.
And we find it almost inconceivable that any responsible American
statesman is likely to press a point that will so inevitably
militate to the advantage of Germany." (4)
They argue that the United States suffers far less now
(l)Nation (N.Y. ) July 1,1315:5' (2) Ibid Nov. 13,1915
Cur. Hist. Dec. 1915:485 -Am, Note Oct. 31 - (3)London Times
Nov, 8,1915 Editorial Page (4)Muirhead in Nation (fi. Y.
)
Dftp. r? t 191 5: JaiS^
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than did England in the Civil War and that Britain then acquiesced
in our policy even when we went beyond what one considered our
rights as a belligerent, (l) And indeed, if we come back to the
matter of contraband and continuous voyage once more, we must very
nearly admit there is some truth, whether it be sound argument or
not, in the British contention. For, while Westlake and the other
prominent writers of international law quoted above, would seem
to protest against American practice in the matter of continuous
voyages, yet, in reference to absolute contraband, at least, the
English Government cannot be said to have completely denied that
principle in 1861-1865, Let us quote at length from Lord Russell ! s
reply to the complaint of the owners of the Petsrhof
f
.
"The Government of the United States has clearly no right
to seize British vessels bona fide bound from this country to the
ports of Vera Cruz or Matamoras, unless such vessels attempt to
touch at, or having an immediate or contingent destination to, some
blockaded port or place or are carriers of contraband of war, des-
tined for the Confederate States; and in any admitted case of such
unlawful capture, Her Majesty's Government however cannot , ..without
violating the rules of international law, claim for the British
vessels navigating between these places any general exemption from
the belligerent right of visitation and search by the cruisers of
the United States; nor can they proceed upon any general assumption
that such vessels may not so act as to render their capture lawful
and justifiable, Nothing is more common than for those who con-
template a breach of blockade or the carriage of contraband, to
disguise their purpose by a simulated destination, and by deceptive
papers; and the situation of the ports on the coast of Mexico with
(l) London Times l Tov, 3, 1915 Editorial Page.

t
i J.
reference to the Confederate States is such as to make it not only
possible, but in many cases probable, that an ostensible "exican
destination would be resorted to as a cover for objects which would
really justify capture. It is the right of belligerents to capture
all vessels, reasonably suspected of either of these transgressions
of international law and whenever any such case of capture is allegec
the case cannot be withdrawn from the consideration of the prize
court of the capture, - - - - Her Majesty's Government cannot, upon
ex parte statements, deny the belligerents in this war the exercise
of those rights which in all wars in which Great Britain has been
concerned, she has claimed herself to exercise." (l)
Certainly, this sounds almost as fair a statement of the
American side of the affair as Seward himself could have advanced.
It would even seem that Russell is admitting the general principle
underlying the doctrine ov continuous voyages. Americans may con*
tend, on the other hand, that the address of the noble lord indicates
that a vessel can be detained, as in the case of the Peter hoff,
only under suspicion warranting her trial before a prize court.
She was not taken into port for search for suspicious evidence.
She had been examined at sea, and taken before the court for further
proof of innocence or guilt. (2)
The address of Lord r.ussell is of interest, in addition to
the points indicate:* In the first place, it would seem to reflect
somewhat upon our present criticisms of the British prize courts a3
expressed in the October note. Secondly, the above letter was
considered to be a warning to deceitful shippers of the time and was
referred to (together with a similar address by Russell to the
(1) £x. Iocs . 1863-34 I 229-30,
(2) Ex. Docs. Chapter iv.

Liverpool merchants) in the case of the Springbok as evidence
against the defendants, (l) & (3)
it are not unable., of course, to find instances of
British complaint against our prize court procedure. Tor example
j
in the British protest against the seizure of the Labuan 1833, Lord
F.u33ell complains that "Mr. Seward - - - declines to order her
release, but insists that the case be left to the distant and
uncertain result of proceedings before a prize court." C3) It must
be admitted, however, that in this instance there was considerable
ground for complaint, the Labuan being held upon the rather flimsy-
suspicion "not unfairly attaching to all vessels sailing under the
British colors in the neighborhood where she was taken." (4) In
passing, we might suggest that it looks as though Seward in this
instance was getting perilously near the present British theory as
to "burden of proof".
In general we may say, however * that the British did not
at least acquiesce in our practice of that period. We may say,
too, that so far as absolute contraband is concerned, if we accept
Britain'3 lists we cannot, and be consistent, register any great
complaint, except it be in the manner of the British practice. If
we accept her view of the effect of modern conditions and necessity
we might even admit the exception. There would still remain, how-
ever, the big question of the application of the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyages to conditional contraband - meaning by the expres-
sion 'conditional contraband* the elaborate list that Britain has
presented. We could not well consent to this, I think, as we
(1) 5 Wallace 24,
(2) Ex, Cocs. 1863-3 I 171-2,
13 J Fx. Docs. 1832-3 I 80
(4) Ibid; 81.
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should thereby be ignoring the very point of distinction between
conditional and absolute contraband. Were we to admit the legality
of British action in this resyect, kve should be neglecting cur duty
as protectors of the rights of our traders and shippers on the
high 3eas. President Wilson has coupled the question with that
of search and evidence and has ^ut our Government on record as
protesting the _>ritish action. It is well to keep these protests
in mind.

Chapter VI,
BLOCKADE A 7:D CONTINUOUS VOYAGE.
The whole 4uestion of contraband has for the present
assumed much less practical importance since "'arch 1,1915, for on
that date, Britain's "so-called" blockade of Germany was announced
to have begun. The contraband question still remains, it is true,
but we hear little of it. Blockade and search are the two big
problems before us now.
Without going deeply into the origin and history of the
principle of the blockade, it may be said that "In order to deter-
mine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given
only where there is, by disposition of the power which attacks it
with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in
entering.
" (2) This is, as will be remarked, evidently an attempt
at interpretation of the fourth clause of the Declaration of Paris,
that a blockade, to be binding, must be effective. The various
rules, such as public notification, presumption of knowledge of
existence, penalty to blockade-runners, which international custom
has attempted to establish concerning the conduct of blockade will
best be illustrated by the discussion following of our lengthy
controversies between our Government and Great Britain, both now and
in the past.
It should be understood that blockade is an extreme
measure, aimed to stop not only contraband, but all sea borne trade
with the enemy. (3) When we come to ask whether blockade can be
extended to include all trade, both land and sea - whether, in short,
the doctrine of continuous voyages can be applied to blockade - we
at once get into all sorts of difficulties, as we shall see.
.
U)EriA. W. Paper -Cur. Hist. Mr. 1916:1102 (2 ) Qonv. 1901 be
tween Eng. and Russia 19th Cent, [3) Earner MS on Blockade p«26

Let us come at once to the es tablishment of Britain's "so-
called" blockade of Germany. Following Germany's declaration of a
"war zone" about the British Isles and France in February, 1315,
the British Government declared itself "therefore driven to frame
retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities
of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, They (Britain and
France) wrill therefore hold themselves Tree to detain and take into
port, ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership
or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or car-
goes unless they would be otherwise liable to condemnation, (l) It
will be observed that the term "blockade" is not used in the note
at all.
On March 5> Secretray Bryan dispatched a reply to the
above not
-2 to the following effect;
"The first sentence (of the British notice) claims a right
pertaining to a state of blockade. The last sentence proposes a
treatment of ships and cargoes as though no blockade existed.
(That is, they are not to be confiscated). The two together pre-
sent a proposed course of action previously unknown to international
iaw ----- What is to be done with a cargo of non-contraband or
conditional contraband detained under the declaration?" (3)
The order in council which fully explained the British
intentions in this respect was received by our State Department a
few days later. In substance it was as follows:
" All merchant ships setting sail for German ports after
March 1, 1915 were to be detained unless they had a pass to neutral
or allied ports. Her goods, if not liable to condemnation as
(1) Amb. Rice to Bryan -Int. Gone, X: 33-40.
(2) International Correspondence pp. 40-41.
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contraband, were either to be requisitioned by the Allied Govern-
ments or returned. (An ans/:er to Bryan* e question, it would seem.)
(3) Concerning goods similarly shipped from German ports
these were to be discharged in British or Allied ports, there to be
requisitioned or ^old, no money to be paid out until the end of the
war, however, "unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral
property before th« issue of this order. "
(3) "Rvery merchant vessel which ceiled from her port of
departure after March 1, 1915, or. her way to a port (Herman or
neutral , that is) carrying goods with and enemy destination or
which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in
a British or Allied port, "there to be turned over to a prize court,
and to be restored to the person entitled thereto - - unless they
be either contraband or requisitioned."
(4) Goods from non-German ports, of enemy origin or prop-
erty "may be required to discharge such goods in a 3ritish or allied
port" to be turned over to a prise court for requisition or sale,
the proceeds to w be paid into the court and dealt with in such
manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just."
(3) "Provision is made for claimants to issue writs for
immediate release on bond.
(8) Declares a ship billed for a neutral port and changed
to enemy port liable to condemnation, (l)
Should we accept this order in council as establishing a
legal blockade, I think that we may say that, precedent or no, here
- - - especially in sections three and four - - we have the theory
of continuous voyages stretched beyond a point which our courts have
never approached. With it is the promise of non-confiscation of
(l) Text in Int. Cone. X. 45-46.
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of blockade runners , the denial of a right which we have freely
exercised in our Civil War, (l)
Just here
,
however, is where President Wilson has caught
the main point of the protest. He refuses to recognize a otate of
blockade to exist at all. The order in council of May 15 3ays the
American reply of -arch 30 "would constitute, were its provisions
to be adequately carried into effect, a practical assertion of
unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole
European area and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign
rights of the nations now at peace. " (2)
Our Government therefore denies the existence of a. legal
blockade at all. (3) Mr, Wilson concedes that modern conditions
may in some measure affect the conduct of a blockade, (4) but he
denies very emphatically that Britain can virtually blockade neutral
ports under mere suspicion that such ports were serving as gateways
for German commerce
. Therefore, n in circumstances which have
developed, it (the United States Government) feels that it can no
longer permit the validity of the alleged blockade to go :
unchallenged." (g)
The grounds upon which our Government has based this pro-
test have already been intimated, but let them be repeated and
summarized here.
(l) The order in council of March 15 is not really in the
form of an announcement of blockade, it did not lay down rules for
its presumed knowledge, or define the area blockaded* according
to recognized principles such as thoseset forth in the Declaration
(l) Ex. Docs. 1832-3,1 2 38-3 (Seward to Lyons)
[2 1 Inter. Cone. X p. 47. (o) Amer.
TT
ote Oct. 21, 1915.
(3) Ibid (4) Ibid (5; Garner MS. On blockade p. 2-3.

of Lor.don. (l)
(£) It would seem that "The novel and quite unprecedented
feature of the blockade is that it embraces many neutral, ports and
coasts, bars access to them and subjects all neutral ships seeking
to approach them, to the same suspicion that would attach to them
were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain. (2)
(0) The non-conf i3cat ion clause is irregular,
(4) All these irregularities are justified upon the
grounds, first as a retaliatory act against Germany's alleged
violations of the laws of war, and secondly "In their desire to al-
leviate the burden which the existence of a state of war at sea
must inevitably impose on neutral sea-borne commerce, they declare
their intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right
to confiscate ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claim-
ed in respect of breaches of blockade. They restrict their claim
to the stopping of cargoes destined for cr coming from the enemy's
territory." (3)
It will be seen that our objections to the blockade are
largely technical, therefore, rather than practical. The most
serious objection is the second which I have enumerated. The
others might offer no practical difficulties but might even, as Grey
has aserted, react to the benefit of neutrals.
For in spite of the fact that the term blockade is not
used in the order in council it is quite evident that it was the
intention of the British to impose one. All the correspondence
(1)Garner MS. on "Blockade" p. 3-3. (2) Ibid.
(3) Grey to Page - quoted by Garner "s . Blockade p. 3 -text
of note Int. Gone. " X P 38. The American assertion that the blockade
doss not bear with equal severity upon all neutrals has lost force
since British submarines have apparently closed the German -
Scandinavian trade.

since that date clearly indicates as much. The quest ion as to
whethei our Governments' stand can be justified may well rest for a
moment while we consider, for sake of historical comparison,, approx-
imately parallel points at issue in connection with our blockade of
1831-183 3.
On April 19,1831, the President of the United States
issued a proclamation of blockade which was published in both
America and foreign countries. This first proclamation included
the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas. The first three paragraphs recite the
reasons for such a step, namely: Inability to enforce customs laws
in those states, threats of those states to issue letters of marque
and reprisal and a previous warning to the insurrectionists to
dispers e.
The proclamation then went on to state the intention of
the President, in lieu of Congressional action, "to set on foot a
blockade of the port3 within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of
the laws of the United States and the law of the nations in such
case provided. For this purpose, a competent force will be posted
so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports afore-
said. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a
vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of the said
ports, she will be duly warned by the commander of one of the
blockading vessels, who will endorse on her register the fact and
date of such warning, and if the same vessel 3hall again attempt to
enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to
the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her and
her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable." (l)
(l) llicoley & TTay -Abraham Lincoln VI 3 48-33.

Another paragraph proclaimed that all ships moles tine
United States vessels "under pretended authority of the said 3tates"
to be pirates.
A proclamation of April 27, extended the blockade to
include the states of Virginia and I'orth Carolina. [\ )
Two things or points of difference between the proclama-
tions of 1831 and the British order in council of 191 5 stand out,
First, the blockade is regularly established as a blockade under the
rules of international lav/ and is to be enforced according to such
law, not by municipal ordinance. Second, and resulting from the
first, vessels and cargoes attempting to violate the American
blockade are to be subject to confiscation.
The question arises in our minds at once as to whether the
British forbearance in the latter instance affects the technical
irregularity of their conduct in the first instance. While I
personally and as a very matter of fact critic rather than one who
3peaks from a breadth of knowledge of the subject believe that it
does, I wish to let the question rest while we consider the common
points of the two blockades.
It will be remembered that the Declaration of Paris de-
clares that a blockade, to be legal, must be effective. That is the
one great essential, according to the Declaration. How do the two
blockades under discussion compare in this respect?
Our Government has complained that that the effectiveness
of the present British blockade depends largely upon the fact that
it has been extended to include neutral ports, (2) a point which I
have already mentioned. (3.) Yet, the British blockade is probably
(l) Nicoley E Hay -Abraham Lincoln VI C4S-50.
(3) Amer. TTote Oct. 31 (3) Page 41
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as effective as any modern blockade can be (l) or indeed aa our
Civil War blockade was. Ita extension involves the question of
continuoua voyage ana t v.e closely relate! one of embargoes.
As to the eff ect iveneas of our Civil War blockade, let us
take note of a few temporary remarks upon the aubject. In "ay 1883,
we discover that our minister, Charles Francis Adams is "profoundly
concerned at the inefficacy of the laws of Creat Britain in which
a large proportion of the undertakings (to run blockade) originate,
to apply any adequate policy of prevention," (2) and he urges the
strengthening of Bri ti_sh statues to prevent blockade running.
Certainly, a blockade that needed such aid could not have been
perfect in its effectiveness. In deed, we cannot but see some
justice in Lord nussell f s earlier remarks on this blockade, v;hich
"kept up irregularly, has when enforced, seriously injured the trade
and manufactures of the United Kingdom. Yet Her Majesty's Covern-
ment have never sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfec-
tions of the blockade to declare it ineffective", but "The United
States Covernment cannot expect that Great Britain should frame new
statutes to aid the federal blockade, the application of which it is
their duty to confine within the limits of international law." (3)
The last phrase brings in the matter
_
ex tens ion of
blockade
, and we are again struck by the resemblance in the two
s ituations.
Just at present we are asserting that "The United States
maintains the right to sell goods (evidently free goals are inferred}
into the general stock of a neutral country (4) and denounces as
(learner MS on "Blockade" p. 30 (3) %• Docs. 18-32-3 I, 85.
($) Ex, Docs. IS 33-3: 34-85.
(4) Cf. Chase -5 Wallace p. 2 3

illegal and unjustifiable, any attempt of a belligerent to inter-
fere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the pre-
vious supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports
renew or replace, has been sold to the enemy." (l) "':oreover,
even if the goods listed as conditional contraband are destined to
an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in
itself sufficient to justify their seizure," (3) Britain has also
arranged "to create in these neutral countries, special consignees
or consignment corporations with power to refuse shipments and to
determine when the state of the country's resources require the
importation of neutral commodities." (3) (The reference is, of
course, to Zritains 1 enforced embargo upon the shipments of neigh-
boring neutrals to Germany.)
We complain, in other words, that Zritains 1 blockade
unfairly effects neutrals - - that the doctrine of continuous voyage
has been extended beyond all precedent and the Declaration of London
and that "bona fide trade with neutral countries is greatly reduced
as a consequence." (4) Finally, we protest against the manner in
which the British have applied the disputed doctrine, that is, to
lan I transhipments, (5)
Let us consider first the claim to the right to sell goods
into the common stock of a neutral country, even though other goods
are therby released for enemy use. This would certainly seem
reasonable enough, since our Government has, theoretically at least,
denied the existence of a blockade at all. Indeed, it seems strange
that our Government should make the distinction between goods sent
in and goods released, for if no blockade exists, have we not a
right to sell any free goods directly to the enemy?
(1) Am. TTote Oct. SI (2) Ibid. (3JIbid (4-) Ibid
(5) Bryan to Page - Int. Cone. X p. 48.
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Certainly we may sell them through a neutral port. Are we not, in
making this guarded distinction, admitting the existence of a block-
ade? If it is basing its contention on Civil War precedents, there
can scarcely be any analogy unless the blockade is admitted. Yet,
the very words, "to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral
country" seem a reminder of those of Chief Justice Chase in the case
of the Springbok. This was a case of blockade-running, (l) Chase
declaring "If the real intention of the owners was that the cargo
chould be landed at Nassau and incorporated by real sale into the
common stock of the island, it must be restored." (3)
If our Government recognizes the existence of a blockade,
it would seem that the point made by President Wilson is possibly
well talc en. He seems to intimate that if the goods sold , rather
than those replaced, were to be passed on to the enemy, then the
doctrine of continuous voyages would apply as it did in the case of
the Springbok. If there is no blockade, however, why make the
distinction?
In the very next paragraph, the President does get back to
what might be the "non-blockade" theory. He claims the right to
pass conditional contraband through neutral territory to the enemy.
This protest would have some weight, no matter whether we consider it
under the rules of blockade or those of contraband. Conditional
contraband, to be subject to seizure, must be proved to be actually
destined for the use of the armed forces of the enemy. Both the
declaration of London and the words of Chief Justice Chase would
(1) The Amer, Note of Oct. 21 doubts whether this was a
case of blockade-running or contraband, and yet the court
expressly states that the character of the cargo was ascertained
only as a clue to destination to a blockade port.
(2) 5 Wallace 2 5.

indicate this much, (l) This is only another way of saying,
generally,, that the theory of continuous voyages does not apply to
conditional contraband. The two ideas are contradictory to each
other, as we pointed out above. (2)
If, on the other hand, we concede a blockade to be exist-
ent, we still have some argument and precedent on our side. For
our courts held, in the case of the ^eterhoff, that transhipments
by land as opposed to transhipments by sea, break the continuity of
the voyage. Basing his decision upon English precedent, Chase
concluded "These cases fully recognize the lawfulness of neutral
trade to or from a blockaded country by inland navigation or
transportation," (3)
So far as such precedents count, therefore, it would seem
that we are upon mors or less firm ground, no" matter tfhich view
we take in this instance. If there is no blockade, then of course
all free goods may go to the enemy by way of neutrals and there is
at least considerable doubt that the same cannot be said of con-
ditional contraband. If there is_ a blockade, the contraband laws
of course remain the same and our precedents say that free goods may
be transported by land to the enemy. As to the last point, we
cannot help seeing some justice in the British plea that "times have
changed," Chase was making his decision when the railroad
facilities between Matamoras, Mexico and the rebel states were
practically nil. In the present instance, Grey points out that
Germanys 1 nautral neighbors offer land transhipment to the interior
often more cheaply than by sea. The distinction therefore becomes
ridiculous, he would say. (4) To admit the distinction would be to
(l)Oohen Declaration of London 100; ?.cott-cases 760-731
Cf. Garner Am. J. Int. Law Apr, 15, 1915: 387-90 (2) See page 30
(3) 5 Wallace, 37, (4) Grey to 3age Int. Oonc. X 28.
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say that only island countries such as England can be blockaded at
all. (l) But there again, we have the Englishman arguing upon the
extent of the blockade, while the American, theoretically, at least,
refuses to admit the existence of the blockade. Certainly, I
should say, to admit the American point of view would give us the
more practical argument., in this instance at least.
We corns to the question of the right of a belligerent to
enforce embargoes upon neutrals. The British Government, not
content with the power of stoning suspicious cargoes at sea, has
adopted the plan of compell in t -Tolland and other adjacent neutrals
to guarantee the non-exportation to Germany of any goods whatsoever
(with a few unimportant 3xcsption). Confronted by the English
fleet and the threat to cut off all their trade, these countries
had no alternative but to comply with the British demands. (S) As
a result, "Vessels have been held until they have reconsigned their
cargoes to a consignee in a neutral country designated by the
British Governmen. " (-3) If we are again to fall back upon pre-
cedent, we may safely say that we never did such a thing as this -
for obvious reasons. The only near neutrals were Mexico and
Canada. The former would have been unable to comply because she
was in the throes of civil war herself. Canada happened to be
under the protection of the British Government and the British
Government was not to be overawed by our comparatively smal? navy^
as are Denmark and Holland by the powerful fleets of the Allies,
We had to content ourselves, therefore, with the protest quoted
above, (page 45) that Great Britain should change her statutes to
(l) ration Bee. 2, 1915: 546.
(2 J Am. Note Oct. 31$ S.P.Piggott -19th Gent. Ap, 1915:745.
(3) Appendix Amer. Note Oct. 31.
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hslp us maintain our blockade
, and with an embargo upon our own
trade with the British West Indies and Bahamas. The latter step was
taken early in 1862 and under authority of a Congressional act. (l)
The act called forth the following protest from the British O-overn-
ment. It protested "that her commerce should not be interrupted
except upon the principles which ordinarily apply to neutrals.
These principles authorize nothing more than a strict and actual
blockade of the enemys 1 ports by such force as shall, at the least,
make it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter them. - - - Her
Majesty's Government consider it would be introducing a novel and
dangerous principle into the law of the nations if the belligerent,
instead of maintaining an effectual blockade, were to be allowed,
upon mere suspicion or belief, well or ill-founded, that certain
merchandize could ultimately find its way to the enemy's country, to
cut off all commerce between their commericial allies and them-
selves." (2)
But change a few names and terms and we might almost be-
lieve we were reading from the American note of 1915. It may be
objected that there is a great deal of difference between an embargo
of one's own ports and in a blockade of neutral ports. To which we
may concede a "perhaps", but so far as the question of the extension
of blockade is concerned, that is about all that we may fairly con-
cede. Furthermore, let us continually bear in mind the difference
in relative power of the Governments concerned. When we do this,
it seems to me that Britain almost has the favorable side of the
comparison. I am thinking particularly of that non-confiscation of
blockade-runners clause. Holding in her mighty navy the power that
(1) Dip. Oorr. 1835: 3; Ex. Docs. 1833-3 I 489.
(2) Ex. Docs. 1833-3 I; 294-5.
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she has, it seems to ma that Britain has been much fairer and more
conciliatory, more mindful of that elusive thing termed internation-
al law, than might have been the case with us fifty years ago.
Indeed, I cannot bu almost a^rse with the gist of the
assertion from an English daily in urging a stricter blockade: "The
practical grievances of thi United States frorr. our blockade appear
to be negligible, but their legal case is strong," (l)
That is, Britain's blockade has not followed the dictates
of international law in every detail, but is dependent upon a
municipal ordinance for its application. Aside from these tech-
nical irregularities, I think that we must agree with Professor
Garner that "If this is not recognized as an effective blockade,
blockade under modern conditions is impossible." (l)
I am aware that there are many who do not accept this view.
Professor Hart of Harvard, for example, has launched some of the
most extreme criticisms against the British measures. (2) There is
no doubt that the British have overstepped their rights as belliger-
ents and our Government has very properly protested. The point I
am endeavoring to make, however, is this: With far greater power in
their hands than we had in the Civil War, the British have refrained
from committing acts, such as confiscating blockade-runners, which
we either did or tried to do in the Civil War.
Another point which is worthy of note is the striking
contrast between the correspondence of the two periods under discus-
sion, Take, for example, the British note of February 10, 1915.
This note is frankly conciliatory and is framed in the most cordial
(l) Manchester Gaurdian quoted Lit. Digest Mar. 4, 1913.
Z ) Garner MS. on "Blockade" : 30
3) See Currant History, Apr. 1916$ Hart on "Freedom
of the Seas".

52.
manner. In it is "an evidently sincere desire manifested to inter-
fere as little as possible with legitimate neutral trade and to
reduce to a minimum the hardships to which neutrals were subjected
in consequence of the Allied measures. " (l) Or examine the most
recent British note of April 23 concerning the coalition of neutrals
to protect the rights of neutral powers. On the American side, the
note of October 21, -while firm in tone, is nevertheless courteous
and conciliatory.
When we turn to the notes of Seward, on the other hand, we
find a marked contrast. Seward, at times, seemed to be bent upon
causing a break between America and England, so violent and threat-
ening were some of his notes. The exchange of notes over the Trent
Affair might easily have led to war between Britain and America had
there been a cable to insure rapid transmission of them. Or turn
to the rash note of July 11, 1883, in which Seward told Adams that if
English harbors continued to offer refuge to Confederate cruisers,
"The navy of the United States will receive instructions to pursue
these enemies into the ports which thus , in violation of the law of
nations and the obligations of neutrality, become harbors of
pirates." (2)
Fortunately, one of the ablest diplomats that our country
has produced, Charles Francis Adams, was at the English court and
he wisely took upon himself the responsibility of refusing to lay the
note before the British Government, When it finally came out the
following spring it created a storm in Parliament. (3^ As early
(1) Earner MS. "Blockade": 34
(2) Ex. Docs. 1853-4, I: 3 53.
(3) Dip. Corr. 1954-5, I: 153-7.
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as May 21, 1861, one of Sewards 1 dispatches to Adams coolly
discussed the possibilities and even probabilities of a war with
Britain, (l) This time Lincoln used his blue pencil in time. (3)
One more illustration, thin time from Lord Lyons, though
perhaps of Palmerston's authorship. should be considered. The note
says that there is the impression in England that the United states
"by capture, by wanton imprisonment of the masters and ^art of the
crew of the captured vessels to put a stop to the British trade to
Matamoras altogether - - - It is obvious that ^reat Britain must
interfere to protect her flag." (-3)
Let me repeat that in the correspondence and in the con-
duct of the parties involved today, there is much that betokens
well for the recognition of neutral rights and international law.
When we hear oir Edward Grey telling the House of Commons that the
present blockade must be carried on "consistently with the right of
neutrals and we must let through bona fide vessels for neutral ports"
we cannot but feel hopeful. We may even wonder whether if we had
in our hands the comparative power which Britain holds to-day, we
should have taken the trouble to justify every questionable action
upon the grounds of international law. That Britain does is, as I
say, a hopeful sign.
(l) "ickolay and Hay, Lincoln, VI 277-: 5.
C2J Ibid.
(o) Ex. Iocs. 1862-3 I: 396.

Chapter 711,
sowoiusiona.
To summarize, the situation as it now stands (April of 1313)
we can best quote, for the British point of view, from a recent
British White Paper: (l)
"The state of things produced is, in effect, a blockade,
adapted to the conditions of modern warfare and commerce, frith the
only difference being that the goods seized are not necessarily-
confiscated - - - Once their destination or origin is established,
the power to stop them is complete.
"Our contraband rights, however, remain unaffected,
although they, too, depend upon the ability to prove enemy desti-
nation.
"That our blockade prevents any commodit ities from reach-
ing Germany is not, and under the geographical conditions, cannot,
be true. But it is already successful to a degree which good
judges both here and in Germany thought impossible and its efficiency
is growing day by day. It is right to add that these results have
been obtained without any serious friction with any neutral Govern-
ment," (Alas for Mr, Wilson 1 s industry])
For the American side of the question I have already
quoted extensively from the American note of October 31, 1915. It
i% here that our Government declares that the "so-called" blockade
of the British is "ineffective, illegal, and indefensible" and "this
country will henceforth protest every case of capture under the
so-called blockade. The British methods of obtaining evidence as
(l) ^ur. Hist, Mar, 1*13, 1102-3,

to contraband are, aa has been discussed, declared Illegal, Their
prise courts are attacked. Embarassed no doubt by our own pre-
cedents , we have seen Britain's list of contraband swelled without
any protest from our Government, (l) Finally , there is our own
(by use if not by discovery) doctrine of continuous voyages running
through all three of the ';ig issues which this thesis has endeavored
to comprehend. Our Government would maintain that the British have
"out-Chased ~hao e" aa it were.
Let us review briefly these several issues in the order in
the order in which they have been treated in order to draw our con-
clus ions
.
In the matter of search at sea we have seen that our own
skirts are fairly clear to give force to our protest. In the past,
we made at least the moat of our searches at sea, Yet, it does not
seem to me that the British are wandering from the practical
application of the American theory when they plead "modern condi-
tions" to Justify their talcing of vessels into port for search. The
chief difficulty aeema to be that the point involves that of long
delays and damaged cargoes. Many innocent vessels have been kept
in port for 'lays, while their destructible cargoes spoiled. The
case of the Chicago meat packers is especially notorious. (2) And
yet the British have shown a remarkable willingness to reimburse
owners of such cargoes, the case just mentioned having been recently
(April 26, 1916) finally settled. The complaints in this matter of
delays are far from being new, as may be observed from even a casual
perusal of our Civil ^ar correspondence. The case of the Sunbeam
is to the point. This British vessel was hit by a gals while on
the way to Matamoras and was blown into Wilmington, "orth Carolina,
(l)Bryan to "tone Int. Cone. X p. 3. (SjCurrent dailies Cct.-Vov. '15

where a blockader captured her and sent her to a Tew York prize
court. Her crew filed a long oomplaint of improper treatment, delay;
damage, etc. and declared that attempte had been made to persuade
them to enlist in the federal navy, (l)
The Qrior suffered a similar experience and was the
occasion of a similar protest from Britain. (2)
There are many cases in dispute today, however, which
cannot be justified nor excused under plea of necessity or remuner-
ation for damages. If the British insist upon taking vessels into
port for search, they must provide adequate means to hasten that
search and to cause no more delay than if it were made at sea.
Uor can the mere suspicion that hidden away somewhere in the center
of a cotton bale there is a piece of copper or rubber, (3) justify
in the average American mind, long delays and the unloading of an
entire cargo. It seems unreasonable, too, that a certificate from
a British consul as to the innocence of cargo and destination should
not be recognized, as sufficient to establish such innocence.
Indeed, it seems to me that if some arrangement could be made by
which both British and American consuls would inspect both manifests
and cargoes, the whole question of search and delays wauld be
reduced to a minimum.
As to the question of kinds of evidence and manner of
obtaining it, we have seen that unless it be in quantity, the
British offense is scarcely different from ours of the past. I am
constrained to refer, for example, to Sewa?d$s reply to the British
complaint concerning the Labuan, Seward explained" that the vessel
had become involved in a suspicion not unfairly attaching to all
(1) Er, Docs. 1853-4,1: 450-5. (2) Ibid -1863-3, I: 434,
(3) Nation July 1, 1915.
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vessels sailing under the British colors in the neighborhood of the
place where she was taken." (l) If the British have any sense of
humor left they might readily seize upon this very uo tat ion to
apply to their conduct towards all neutral vessels found in the
English channel and the North Sea.
Nevertheless, where neutral vessels are held for lor.-
periods of time on mere suspicion , while outside evidence is sought
everywhere, I do not see how the British can justify their conduct*
It is again -oin- u^on the theory that the "burden of proof rests
upon the captive, rather than the captor -that a ship, or cargo is
guilty until found innocent. This is entirely contrary to American
thinking in matters criminal and to us it seems equally unjust in
matters of contraband and blockade. The British theory has
resulted in long delays of innocent cargoes for the sake of the
guilty few. We cannot accept that theory and be consistent. This
point might also become unimportant, however, if the plan of con-
sular inspection be adopted as suggested.
In matters of contraband, the question seems to depend
largely upon whether we accept Britain's classifications. We have
apparently done so. The whole matter then becomes of the distinc-
tion between conditional and absolute contraband, with reference to
the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages. Here, I
think, is our surest ground, for both precedent and authority seem
largely upon our side. Our own courts, the Declaration of LonJon
and its commentators seeir. fairly well agreed that conditional
contraband is outside the application of the doctrine. To apply it
would admit dangerous opportunities for abuse. lorsover, Britain's
sole authority for such application is a municipal ordinance as
[1)EX* Docs* I 1S33-3: SI.

33.
opposed to international law and custom. So much, Sir Edward r rey,
has himself admitted, and his explanation that cases might be appeal-
ed to the Privy Council or a board of arbitration comprises rhat the
Ration calls "virtually a confession with a weak show of avoidance'.'
If we are going to distinguish at all between conditional and
absolute contraband, I do not see how Britain's application of the
doctrine of continuous voyages can be justified, although we may well
appreciate her predicament.
But,, as I have said, except for the few cases against 'which
our Government has protes ted ,the question of contraband has become
insignificant in comparison with that of blockade. The blockade I
have already fully dis cus s ed. I think that for all practical
purposes, we must admit the legality of the British blockade in pro-
portion to its efficiency. It has of late been conducted with a
frankness and a fairness which are commendable. The -riti3h have
confiscated few, if any, cargoes for :..sre breach of blockade and have
shewn themselves ready to reimburse our merchants for losses through
delays. I must repeat that while I would not venture to take
exception to Mr. V.'ilson's or 'lr. Bryan*3 authority in citing this
non-conf is cat ion clause as being opposed to the technical rules of
blockade, yet I cannot see how, practically^ we can contend such a
point. To confiscate such cargoes would only add to the friction
between the two Governments, and Great Britain plainly wi3h.es to
avoid that. Bet us not go looking for further trouble, therefore,
but admit that with the exception of certain specific and irreparable
abuses, the present blockade is as affective and legal as was ours
of the Civil War, or as any modern blockade can be.
The question of cont ir.uous i^oyages and blockade remains.
Citation Aug. 1°, 1213: 192,

Saving assumed the blockade to be legal* it is interesting to note
the resemblance between British and American applications of the
doctrine. The chief point of diii" erence li3s in our contention
that land reshipment breaks the continuity of the voyage to block-
aded regions. It is doubtful whether this distinction will seem
important or even reasonable, to American practical minis.
The fact that Britain has employed the forced embargo and
c bl er especially irritating measures to aid hex in the application
of the doc trine , is not so much more original than our own embargo
of the Bahama trade as we have seen.
Viewing the whole question, therefore, in a perfectly
unprejudiced and practical frame of mind, and with the facts of
geographic relations as pointed out in an earlier chapter wall in
mind, I think we must agree with Professor Garner that, "If the
right of blockade is to be maintained, the application of the doc-
trine of continuous voyages to blockade-running must be permitted^
otherwise the right will, in many cases be largely worthless.'' (l)
This is not vastly different from Sir Edward Prey's recent
ieclarat ion„ "If - - - the answer is that we are not entitled to
interrupt trade with the enemy through neutral countries, I must say
definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line, it is
a departure from neutrality." (2)
"In the matter of blockade, in the manner of seizure of
contraband, we ourselves stretched the preexisting understandings of
international law during our Qivil waxj if England has how stretched
them more and with less justification, that is a ground for very
determined objections on our part, but it is not a new thing under
the sun." (3)
(l)Oarner MS. "blockade" p. 33. (S)Lon. Daily ~hron. quoted in
t.-i* ri^t "ar. 4, 13:n53 ?l) "at ion Sept. 33, 1315^375
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In all wars, belligerents seek to exalt their Po./Ji-.,
while as neutrals they protest at similar conduct on the part of
others. It looks like "aneternal see-saw," but always there is
slowly emerging "a definitely ascertained set of rules by which
nations shall be guided." (l) If, in this present war, internation-
al law seems a myth, 1st it be recalled that out of every great ./ar
,
international law and recognition of the rights of humanity, have
climbed to greater heights. The very fact that people are reading
of the -luestions at issue is a wonderfully good omen.
VThen the guns of Europe have ceased to roar and the
exhausted powers gather about the council table, then must inter-
national law and civilization come into their own. Then, too,
frill the scholarly, but much ridiculed "notes" 'of President Wilson
most surely be brought forth, and America will have played her
part in the great cause of humanity and civilisation.
(l) ration Sept, 33, 1915: 575.



